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Abstract
Universalism is the thesis that composition is unrestricted: for any non-overlapping objects, those
objects compose something. One of the most influential arguments for universalism is the argu-
ment from vagueness, first advanced by David Lewis and later elaborated and defended by Theo-
dore Sider. I supply a reconstruction of the argument and survey a variety of responses to it.
1. Introduction
Under what conditions do some objects compose something?1 The intuitive answer to the
question is ‘sometimes’. When a hammer head and hammer handle are firmly attached to
one another, they plausibly compose something, namely, a hammer. Before the handle
and head were attached to one another, they plausibly did not compose anything. The
universalist answer is ‘always’: for any non-overlapping objects, those objects compose
something. The handle and head compose something even before they come into contact.
There is even something composed of your nose and the Eiffel Tower – something partly
located in Paris and partly located on your face. Despite such counterintuitive implications,
universalism is widely accepted among metaphysicians, and its popularity is in large part
due to the argument from vagueness.2
The argument from vagueness was first advanced by David Lewis and was later elabo-
rated and defended by Theodore Sider.3 It runs as follows:
(A1) If universalism is false, then there can be a sorites series for composition.
(A2) Every sorites series for composition must contain either borderline cases of compo-
sition or a cut-off with respect to composition.
(A3) There cannot be borderline cases of composition.
(A4) There cannot be cut-offs with respect to composition.4
(A5) So universalism is true.
A sorites series for composition is a series of cases running from a case in which composi-
tion definitely does not occur to a case in which composition definitely does occur,
where adjacent cases are extremely similar in all of the respects that one would typically
take to be relevant to whether composition occurs (e.g., the spatial and causal relations
among the items in question). Borderline cases of composition are cases in which it is
vague whether some things compose anything at all. A cut-off with respect to composi-
tion is a pair of adjacent cases in a sorites series for composition such that in one compo-
sition does occur and in the other composition does not occur.
For purposes of illustration, consider a continuous series of cases running from the
beginning to the end of the assembly of the aforementioned hammer. Assuming (contra
universalism) that the handle and head do not compose anything at the beginning of the
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assembly process, and that they do compose something at the end, this is a sorites series
for composition. There will be points in the assembly process at which the handle and
head are just beginning to be fastened together and at which, intuitively, it is vague
whether they compose something. I will hereafter refer to these points as ‘the intuitive
grey area’. For ease of exposition, I will suppose in what follows that the handle and head
compose at most one object, that they do not themselves have any proper parts, and that
there are no material objects in the universe apart from the handle, the head, and that (if
anything) which they compose.5 Additionally, when I return to this case below, I will
suppose that the handle and head are presently arranged in such a way as to be in the
intuitive grey area.
In what follows, I examine the reasoning behind the two main premises of the argu-
ment from vagueness – A3 to A4 – and various strategies for resisting these premises.6
Much could be said about each of the strategies. My aim here, however, is only to pro-
vide a perspicuous statement of the argument and to present a range of possible responses.
I leave it to the reader to decide whether these responses are best viewed as exposing
genuine shortcomings of the argument or rather as desperate maneuvers for avoiding its
conclusion.
2. The Argument for Premise A3
Premise A3 stands in need of further support. It seems just as clear that there can be
borderline cases of composition as that there can be borderline cases of redness and
baldness. The argument for A3 runs as follows:
(B1) If there can be borderline cases of composition, then there can be count indetermi-
nacy.
(B2) If there can be count indeterminacy, then some expression in some numerical
sentence can be vague.
(B3) No expression in any numerical sentence can be vague.
(A3) So there cannot be borderline cases of composition.7
To say that there is count indeterminacy is to say that it is indeterminate how many
concrete objects there are. A numerical sentence is a sentence of the following sort which
says, for some finite number n, that there are exactly n concrete objects (in this case
n = 2): ‘$x$y(Cx & Cy & x „ y & "z(Cz fi (x = z v y = z)))’.
These premises all seem plausible. Borderline composition does seem to give rise to
count indeterminacy. If the handle and head are a borderline case of composing some-
thing, then it will be indeterminate how many concrete objects there are: two (the
handle and the head) or three (the handle, the head, and a hammer). And if it is indeter-
minate whether there are two or three concrete objects, then the numerical sentence that
says that there are exactly two concrete objects must be vague, in which case it must
contain some vague expression. But numerical sentences seem not to contain any vague
expressions.
3. Resisting Premise B3
All three premises of the argument for A3 can be resisted. Sider’s own defense of A3
focuses almost exclusively on challenges to B3. His defense of B3 may be represented as
follows:
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(C1) No expression in any numerical sentence has multiple admissible precisifications.
(C2) An expression is vague only if it has multiple admissible precisifications.
(C3) So no expression in any numerical sentence is vague.8
The precisifications of an expression are candidate meanings for that expression. C1 is
independently plausible: every expression in the numerical sentence seems already to have
a determinate meaning. C2 is an expression of the natural view that vagueness is always
the result of our having failed to associate a unique meaning with a given expression. In
what follows, I consider two strategies for resisting C1 – focusing on the concreteness
predicate and the quantifiers – and one strategy for resisting C2.9
3.1. BORDERLINE CONCRETA
One might resist C1 by maintaining that the concreteness predicate, ‘C’, has multiple
precisifications. Before examining the strategy, it is important to understand the raison
d’eˆtre of the concreteness predicate. If the concreteness predicate were missing from the
numerical sentences, then every numerical sentence would be determinately false at every
possible world on account of there being infinitely many numbers (sets, propositions,
etc.) in every possible world. Consequently, borderline composition could never result in
indeterminate numerical sentences, and the argument from vagueness would fail.
To guard against this result, the characterization both of the numerical sentences and
of count indeterminacy must incorporate a restriction to those categories of entities that
do not have infinitely many members in every world. So ‘C’ and ‘concrete’ should be
understood as shorthand for ‘not a set and not a number and not a proposition and not a
state of affairs and…’10 It is neither here nor there whether the categories on this list
determinately fall under the ill-defined philosophical notion of concreteness. All that
matters is that no category on the list admits of borderline instances (on pain of falsifying
B3) and that no category on the list subsumes ordinary material objects like handles,
heads, and hammers (on pain of falsifying B1).11
With this in mind, let us see what sort of reasons one might have for taking ‘C’ to
have multiple precisifications. Some philosophers endorse the Barcan formula: e$x/ fi
$xe/. Since it is possible for me to have had a sister, these philosophers must say that
there is something which is possibly my sister. Yet since I have no sister, given plausible
Kripkean assumptions about origins no actual woman is possibly my sister. Nor could any
familiar sort of abstractum (numbers, propositions, etc.) have been my sister. So what
exactly is this thing that could have been my sister? Meinongians might say that it is a
nonexistent woman; possibilists might say it is a merely possible woman; proxy actualists
might say that it is some actual but non-located object (which, although not actually a
woman, could have been).12 Call such things Barcan objects, and their defenders Barcanists.
Barcanists will presumably take there to be infinitely many Barcan objects. The cate-
gory of Barcan objects must therefore be incorporated into the characterizations of ‘con-
crete’ and ‘C’, lest all numerical sentences come out trivially false by Barcanist lights.
Since it is possible for the handle and head to compose something, Barcanists will say that
there is something that they possibly compose. Call it H. Barcanists may then say that, in
the intuitive grey area, H is a borderline case of being a Barcan object. Meinongians may
say that H is a borderline existent; possibilists, that H is a borderline case of being actual;
proxy actualists, that H is a borderline case of being located.13 There would then be
multiple precisifications of ‘C’ – some which apply to this borderline Barcan object and
others which do not – in which case C1 would be false.
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3.2. VAGUE QUANTIFIERS: A LINGUISTIC APPROACH
If indeed it is indeterminate whether the handle and head compose something, it is natu-
ral to suppose that it would then be indeterminate what there is and whether the handle
and head are everything that there is. So perhaps it is ‘$’ and ‘"’ that are responsible for
the vagueness of the numerical sentence. Accordingly, one might deny C1, maintaining
that the quantifiers have multiple admissible precisifications and that relevant numerical
sentences lack a determinate truth value because they are true on some ways of precisify-
ing the quantifiers and false on others. In particular, one might say that ‘$’ has both
‘liberal’ precisifications – that (in some sense) ‘range over’ a fusion of the handle and head
in the intuitive grey area – and ‘conservative’ precisifications – that do not ‘range over’
any such fusion – and that the numerical sentence stated above is true on the conservative
precisifications and false on the liberal ones. Let $C be one such conservative precisifica-
tion and let $L be a liberal precisification.
There is an immediate difficulty in articulating the difference between $L and $C, and,
in particular, what it is for the one to be more ‘liberal’ than the other. Proponents of this
line of response cannot say that there exist different domains associated with the different
precisifications, DC and DL, and that DL includes more objects than DC. For if there is
something in DL but not DC, then DC does not include everything that there is. But in
that case, $C cannot be an admissible precisification for ‘$’: just as any admissible precisi-
fication of ‘$’ must be governed by the introduction and elimination rules associated with
the existential quantifier, any admissible precisification of this (unrestricted!) quantifier
had better include absolutely everything in its domain.14 Consequently, the friend of
vague quantifiers cannot affirm the existence of different domains associated with the dif-
ferent precisifications. The challenge for proponents of this sort of strategy is to find some
way of characterizing the precisifications of the quantifiers which does not commit them
to the existence of multiple candidate domains.15
3.3. VAGUE QUANTIFIERS: AN ONTIC APPROACH
Some reject the linguistic account of vagueness in favor of an ontic account, on which
some sentences lack a classical truth value as a result of vagueness but not as a result of its
being indeterminate which propositions they express.16 Ontic theorists may hold, for
instance, that ‘Paul is bald’ is vague, not because ‘bald’ has multiple precisifications, but
because ‘bald’ determinately expresses the vague property baldness. Similarly, they may
deny C2 and maintain that, although ‘$’ does not have multiple precisifications, it is nev-
ertheless vague as a result of being semantically associated with the vague property exis-
tence. One difficulty with this line of response is that it seems to require the sort of
Meinongian view alluded to above. Vague properties are typically understood to be prop-
erties which have borderline instances, and one who wishes to say that there are things
that are borderline instances of existence must (on pain of incoherence) be prepared to
distinguish between what there is and what exists.17 Below I will consider an alternative
way in which ontic theorists may (and, I think, should) resist the argument from vague-
ness.
4. Resisting Premise B1
Here again is premise B1: if there can be borderline cases of composition, then there can be
count indeterminacy. Notice that the premise does not require that all cases of borderline
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composition give rise to count indeterminacy, and rightly so since some putative cases of
borderline composition plainly would not result in count indeterminacy. Suppose, for
instance, that there are one billion things, the Ts, that are definite parts of Tibbles the cat
and that exactly one object, A, is a borderline part of Tibbles. It is therefore indeterminate
whether the Ts alone compose Tibbles; and if they do not compose Tibbles then plausibly
they do not compose anything at all.18 So the Ts are a borderline case of composing
something. But this is not a case of count indeterminacy. There are exactly a billion and
two concrete objects: Tibbles, A, and the billion Ts.
The reason that borderline composition does not give rise to count indeterminacy in
the Tibbles case is that there is a determinately existing concrete object that the border-
line composers are a borderline case of composing (hereafter: a DECO). But borderline
composition in assembly cases seems not to involve a DECO. There does not seem to be
any determinately existing object that the handle and head are a borderline case of
composing, which is why, in contrast to the Tibbles case, it seems indeterminate whether
there is something in addition to the borderline composers. So, unlike the Tibbles case,
assembly cases seem to exhibit existential indeterminacy – that is, indeterminacy with
respect to which things exist – and this is why they threaten to give rise to count indeter-
minacy.
Suppose, however, that despite appearances there are DECOs in every case of border-
line composition, even in assembly cases. Then B1 will be false: borderline composition
never gives rise to count indeterminacy. I will examine two sorts of ‘DECO maneuvers’
for resisting B1.
4.1. ETERNALISM
Suppose that, as some think, past and future objects exist; not everything that exists is
present.19 One who accepts this view may say that there exists a DECO – namely, a
future hammer – which the handle and head are (at present) a borderline case of compos-
ing.20 In that case, there are exactly three concrete objects—the handle, the head, and
the hammer (which does not exist presently but does exist simpliciter)—and, therefore, no
count indeterminacy.
This strategy has an obvious shortcoming. If I reach the intuitive grey area and then
abort the assembly process, there will be no past, present, or future hammer to serve as
the DECO. Yet all that is needed to secure B1 is that there is at least one case in which
borderline composition gives rise to count indeterminacy. Proponents of this strategy are
therefore forced to admit that composition definitely does not occur in the intuitive grey
area of aborted assemblies.21 This is a tough bullet to bite: the suggestion that whether
some things are a borderline case of composing something depends on whether they once
did or eventually will definitely compose something seems just as unpalatable as the sug-
gestion that whether something is a borderline case of being red depends on whether it
once was or eventually will definitely be red.
4.2. EXPANSIONS
Let us say that some objects have an expansion just in case there is something that is
exactly located in the region that is jointly occupied by those objects. Now suppose that,
although it is indeterminate whether the handle and the head compose something, there
determinately exists an expansion of the handle and the head.22 This would be an object
which is exactly located in the region jointly occupied by the handle and head – and
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which, once the assembly process is completed, will be composed of the handle and head
– but which does not now determinately have them (or anything else) as parts. (In other
words, it is now indeterminate whether the expansion of the handle and head is compos-
ite or mereologically simple.) Accordingly, this borderline case of composition does not
give rise to count indeterminacy, since there are definitely three concrete objects in the
intuitive grey area: the handle, the head, and the presently existing expansion that they
are a borderline case of composing.23 A structurally similar strategy is available to super-
substantivalists, who maintain that material objects are identical to their locations. The
idea here would be to say that the handle and head are identical to the regions of space
that they occupy and that the (determinately existing) larger region which has them as its
subregions is itself a borderline case of being composed of the handle and head.24
5. Resisting Premise B2
Premise B2 of the argument against borderline composition may be defended as follows:
(D1) If there can be count indeterminacy, then some numerical sentence can lack a
determinate truth value.
(D2) If a numerical sentence lacks a determinate truth value, then it must lack a determi-
nate truth value as a result of vagueness.
(D3) If a sentence lacks a determinate truth value as a result of vagueness, then some
expression in that sentence must be vague.
(B2) So, if there can be count indeterminacy, then some expression in some numerical
sentence can be vague.
D1 seems plausible: if it is indeterminate whether there are exactly n concrete objects,
then the numerical sentence for n must lack a determinate truth value. D2 draws its plau-
sibility from the observation that numerical sentences seem not to be susceptible to other
potential sources of indeterminacy (e.g., syntactic ambiguity, reference failure, liar phe-
nomena). D3 is motivated by the thought that vague sentences must ‘inherit’ their vague-
ness from one or more of their constituent expressions.
5.1. SORTAL-DEPENDENCY
The quantifiers in the numerical sentence are meant to be unrestricted. Some maintain
that quantification is intelligible only when explicitly or tacitly restricted to some sortal or
other.25 They will therefore reject D2: numerical sentences lack a determinate truth
value, not as a result of vagueness, but rather as a result of underspecification. Just as the
sentence ‘Jill is ready’ is not truth-evaluable in the absence of some contextually salient
activity, numerical sentences are not truth-evaluable unless their quantifiers are tacitly
restricted to some sortal or other. But any suitable restriction on the quantifiers is bound
to introduce vagueness into the numerical sentences (thus undermining B3).26,27
5.2. ONTIC VAGUENESS REVISITED
We have already seen that those who embrace an ontic theory of vagueness may reject C2.
Another option for the ontic theorist is to reject D3, by maintaining that the numerical
sentence does lack a determinate truth value as a result of vagueness but that none of its
constituent expressions is itself the source of the vagueness. Rather, it lacks a determinate
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truth value because the proposition that it determinately expresses, namely, that $x$y(Cx &
Cy & x „ y & "z(Cz fi (x = z v y = z))), itself lacks a determinate truth value as a result
of vagueness.28 No particular constituent of this proposition (or of the associated numerical
sentence) is single-handedly responsible for the vagueness, just as no particular constituent
of the proposition that Kripke is a kangaroo (or of the associated sentence) is single-handedly
responsible for its falsity.29
One who takes this line is committed to vague existence. But it is worth emphasizing
that one is not thereby committed to there being ‘vague objects’ which do not determi-
nately exist. Proponents of the ontic strategy should resist the inference from its being
vague whether the handle and head compose something to there being some (vague)
thing such that it is vague whether they compose that thing.30 (More generally, they
should reject the following schema: !$x/ fi $x!/.31) It can be vague what exists with-
out there existing anything such that it is vague whether it exists. Accordingly, those
who criticize the ontic strategy on account of an alleged commitment to things ‘such that
it sort of is so, and sort of isn’t, that there is any such thing’ miss their mark.32
6. The Argument for Premise A4
Despite its prima facie plausibility, A4 has been the focus of much of the critical attention
in the literature.33 Sider’s defense of A4 may be understood as follows:
(E1) If there can be cut-offs with respect to composition, then there can be brute
compositional differences.
(E2) There cannot be brute compositional differences.
(A4) So there cannot be cut-offs with respect to composition.34
To say that there are brute compositional differences is to say that there are cases that
differ with respect to compositional facts and that there are no other facts about the cases
that explain, or ground, their compositional differences.
E1 seems plausible: the sorts of differences that one finds among adjacent cases in a
sorites series for composition – for instance, that two atoms are one fraction of a nanome-
ter closer together in the one than in the other – cannot plausibly explain why composi-
tion occurs in one but not the other. E2 seems plausible as well: although all explanation
must end somewhere, compositional facts seem like a poor candidate for explanatory bed-
rock. Furthermore, as Sider observes, cut-offs with respect to composition would be
‘metaphysically arbitrary.’35 In characterizing the sort of arbitrariness at issue as ‘metaphys-
ical,’ he presumably means to distinguish it from the (less pernicious?) sort of linguistic
arbitrariness that would be exhibited by cut-offs in a sorites series for baldness. There is
nothing arbitrary per se about postulating properties with cut-offs in their application con-
ditions, for instance, the property of having 100,000 or fewer hairs. The arbitrariness,
rather, would consist in the fact that the term ‘bald’ picks out a property whose cut-off is
at 100,000 hairs rather than a property whose cut-off is at 99,999 hairs.
7. Resisting Premise A4
7.1. GROUNDED CUT-OFFS
E1 draws much of its force from the observation that the factors that intuitively
explain why composition occurs when it does (e.g., whether relevant items exhibit a
The Argument from Vagueness 897
ª 2010 The Author Philosophy Compass 5/10 (2010): 891–901, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00327.x
Philosophy Compass ª 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
high degree of unity) seem not to admit of cut-offs. However, one might contend that
the factors that intuitively explain compositional differences are not the factors that
in fact explain compositional differences. Suppose, for instance, that one accepts (i) that
there cannot be borderline cases of consciousness and (ii) that, necessarily, conscious
beings are the only composite objects.36 In that case, every possible sorites series for
composition will contain a cut-off with respect to the presence of consciousness.37
Facts about the presence or absence of consciousness may then be held to ground
compositional differences, in which case those differences would not be brute and E1
would be false.
7.2. BRUTE CUT-OFFS
Alternatively, one might deny E2 and embrace the brutality of compositional differ-
ences.38 Here again the idea is to deny that the factors that intuitively explain composi-
tional differences in fact explain compositional differences. But, in contrast to the
previous strategy, one here denies that anything explains compositional differences: there
are no facts in virtue of which the compositional facts are as they are. Notice that this
does not require denying that compositional facts supervene (at least globally) on non-
compositional facts. One may accept that cases must differ in some noncompositional
respect in order to differ in compositional respects without accepting that any specific
noncompositional differences are poised to explain, or ground, compositional differ-
ences.39
8. Conclusion
Sider remarks that the argument from vagueness is not ‘just another Sorites.’40
Sider remarks that the argument from vagueness is not ‘‘just another Sorites.’’40 We can
see now why that is. We have surveyed a wide range of strategies for blocking the
argument from vagueness, each of which required endorsing at least one of the following:
the vagueness of logical vocabulary, Barcan objects, eternalism (together with the denial
of plausible supervenience principles), borderline-composite expansions, supersubstanti-
valism, the sortal-dependency of quantification, vague existence, an eliminativism about
familiar kinds of composites, or the brutality of compositional facts. None of these com-
mitments is already mandated by the usual epistemic, linguistic, or ontic treatments of
vague predicates, vague singular terms, or sorites arguments. I leave it to the reader to
determine whether embracing any one of these escape routes is preferable to accepting
universalism and its ontology of strange fusions.41
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14 See Sider (2001, 128–9) and Lo´pez de Sa (2006).
15 For further discussion of this strategy, see Hirsch (1999, 149–51; 2002, 65–66; 2008, 376), Sider (2003, 2009),
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answer is that its vagueness is the result of its being vague whether the handle and head compose something, which
may in turn be grounded in relevant noncompositional facts about the arrangement of the handle and head.
29 Cf. Hawley (2001, 112–3) and Williamson (2003, 705–7).
30 Cf. Hawley (2002, §5.)
31 See Carmichael (forthcoming) for general discussion of this schema.
32 See Lewis (1986, 212–3); cf. Donnelly (2009, 58). Nor is it clear that this sort of ontic vagueness will give rise
to vague identity; see Hawley (2002, §4) and Williams (2008, 778–9).
33 See Markosian (1998, 237–9), Merricks (2005), Nolan (2006, 725–8), Hawthorne (2006), Smith (2006), and
Cameron (2007, 114–7).
34 Sider (2001, 124).
35 Sider (2001, 124). See Nolan (2006, 726–7) for critical discussion.
36 Accordingly, the continuous series associated with the assembly of the hammer will be regarded as a spurious
example of a sorites series for composition.
37 Hawthorne (2006, 107–9) defends, but does not endorse, such a strategy. Merricks (2005, 631–2) defends a
structurally similar response, according to which compositional cut-offs will always be marked by cut-offs with
respect to the emergence of nonredundant causal powers. See Barnes (2007) for critical discussion.
38 See Markosian (1998, 237–9).
39 See Markosian (1998, 215–6).
40 Sider (2001, 125).
41 As it happens, vagueness is ontological, D3 is false, and there is vague existence. Thanks to Alex Baia, David
Barnett, Ben Caplan, Ted Sider, Alex Skiles, and audiences in Barcelona and Boulder for helpful feedback. I am
especially indebted to Chad Carmichael and Matti Eklund for countless discussions of the argument from vagueness,
and to Trenton Merricks for one particularly illuminating (and intense) discussion. Finally, thanks to David Lewis
and (again) to Ted Sider for this fascinating argument.
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